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We examine the costs induced by endogenous credit constraints and bankruptcy in the presence
of heterogenous shocks –of di:erent types– and the e:ect on the main variables of our economy:
interest rates, production, consumption; and on the distribution of income. Our main model
has a ﬁxed factor, which leads to the existence of rents, as these are necessary for a credit market
to arise in the presence of moral hazard. We ﬁnd that su?ciently small shocks do not trigger
the credit constraints and have no e:ects (even in the presence of labor inﬂexibilities). However,
once the shocks are large enough that some agents become credit constrained, the e?ciency of the
economy decreases and the interest rate falls. These e:ects become stronger when some agents go
bankrupt. We simulate this model to show the importance of these e:ects on the e?ciency of an
economy.
1 Introduction
The ability of an economy to withstand shocks without a signiﬁcant degradation of its performance
is a signiﬁcant advantage. Macroeconomists have shown that the e:ects of shocks are o=en due to the
existence of credit constraints. We examine the costs induced by credit constraints and bankruptcies
induced by moral hazard on the performance of the economy. We also consider the addition of labor
inﬂexibilities and analyze the interaction between credit constraints and labor inﬂexibility in response
to a shock to the endowments of the agents. Our labor constraints take the form of a legal labor
restriction that makes it di?cult to adapt the number of workers to the new conditions of the ﬁrm.
We begin by showing that in a standard constant returns, two mobile factor, static economic
model, each one of these two restrictions by itself has no e:ect on the performance of the econ-
omy. On the other hand, when the two conditions appear, the economy is less e?cient and we can
have bankruptcies. However, this model is not useful for the analysis of credit constraints, because
constrained ﬁrms never obtain loans, so by the conditions of the model we get these results.
¤The authors acknowledge the support of Fondecyt Project #1030502. J. P. Eberhard was an able assistant and M. Goic
gave invaluable advice on the Gams simulations.We proceed to a more realistic model in which credit is possible, because there are rents. This
model introduces a third factor of production that is speciﬁc to each ﬁrm, and that is lost if the
ﬁrm goes bankrupt. We modify the model by retaining the assumption of constant returns to scale,
but separating capital into two types of capital: capital that is speciﬁc to each ﬁrm, plus working
capital, which is fungible. This is a a realistic assumption, since the loss of speciﬁc capital following
bankruptcy it introduces cost that cannot be avoided and a reason to try to prevent bankruptcies.
Speciﬁc capital can be anything that is not easily transferable to a di:erent ﬁrm: speciﬁc equipment,
speciﬁc knowledge about markets, distribution channels, etc.
We assume constant returns to scale to all three factors, but since one of the factors is ﬁxed, there
are decreasing returns to scale to the other factors of production, leading to the existence of rents (as
the residual for the ﬁxed factor). When a ﬁrm su:ers a negative shock to its working capital, ﬁrms try
to attain the new optimal factor combination, and if they cannot achieve it with their own resources,
will require a loan. However, the endogenous credit constraint implies that the ﬁrm may not be able
to get a loan that will lead it to the optimal factor market combination, or that it may not even be
able to get a loan at all. In the case that the entrepreneur receives a loan that is not su?cient to
lead the ﬁrm to the e?cient production point, it will produce ine?ciently. If it gets no loan it has
to compare the value of two options: to produce under the restricted conditions, or to go bankrupt,
losing the speciﬁc capital and o:ering its working capital in the credit market.
In this model we show that credit constraints, even if unaccompanied by labor restrictions, have
real e:ects, altering the e?ciency of the economy, so long as the shocks are su?ciently large. However,
as in the case of constant returns to scale, labor restrictions by themselves do not a:ect the e?ciency
of the economy, though there is an e:ect on the distribution of income among entrepreneurs.
We simplify the previous model by assuming a ﬁxed relationship between working capital (includ-
ing any loan obtained) and labor. In particular, in this model, entrepreneurs must be able to pay in
advance for the workers employed, i.e., mobile capital is a form of working capital. In this model we
are able to characterize the optimal loan of a ﬁrm with di:erent stocks of working capital. We use
this information to derive the e:ect of a shock on the equilibrium of the economy. We show that a
su?ciently large shock (large enough to make the credit constraint active for some agents) leads to a
rise on the optimal size of the ﬁrm, a drop in wages and a drop in the interest rate (it also implies
that the capital labor ratio increases for the ﬁrms that can attain the optimal capital stock. Moreover,
we can show that the e:ect of the labor constraint on the behavior of the agents is to enhance the
e:ect of the shock (so long as the credit constraint is su?ciently strict). We next show that the second
model can be recast so as to have a ﬁxed relationship between capital and labor in the equilibrium,
and that this means that it inherits all its properties.
Finally, we simulate this model to examine the importance of the credit constraints in the presence
of shocks with non-homogenous e:ects. We use a simple approach which captures the features of our
theoretical model. The results conﬁrm the importance of credit constraints and bankruptcy on the
e?ciency of the economy.
2The literature on credit constraints has been mostly macroeconomic, as for example Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), who developed a model of credit constraints and asset prices, and show how
ﬂuctuations can be augmented in this scenario and may become persistent. Aghion et al. (2004) use an
exogenous market constraint to examine the behavior of the economy in the presence of shocks and
show that economies with an intermediate level of ﬁnancial development can be more instable. There
are several di:erences between our paper and the macroeconomic literature on credit constraints: ﬁrst,
we consider bankruptcies and not only credit constraints; second, because we analyze heterogenous
shocks to initially homogenous agents and because we concentrate on the microeconomic aspects of
credit constraints and bankruptcy, while avoiding the complications of dynamic analysis.
Another line of research lies in studying e?ciency in bankruptcy procedures as in the papers of
Bebchuk (1988), Bebchuk (2001), Aghion et al. (1992), Hart (2000), and Hart et al. (1997), among
others. For the case of Chile, we have the report of Bonilla et al. (2003).
2 The general model
We examine a very simple model. There is a ﬁrst period, which serves as a benchmark –there are no
dynamics in the model–, with a symmetric economy having a continuum of identical ﬁrms whose
owners (and the ﬁrms themselves) are identiﬁed with z 2 [0,1]. There is also a continuum of workers
L 2 [0,1] and each worker has an inelastic supply of labor that equals one.
In the ﬁrst period each entrepreneur owns assets ¯ K, with
R 1
0 ¯ Kdz = ¯ K . Each entrepreneur
maximizes proﬁts by hiring Lz = 1,8z workers in this full employment initial economy. We assume
a small country with free capital markets are free so that capital ﬂows in and out of the country face
no constraints.
Workers receive w for the unit of labor o:ered and obtain a utility of Ul(c) = c = w. Firms
produce an homogenous good that is also the numeraire and can be stored as the capital in this
economy (we can think of it as working capital). Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and maximize U(cz) =
cz = p(K, L) + (1 + r)(Kz ¡ K), where L ´ Kz ¡ K is the loan (positive or negative) received by
the agent. The production function has either constant or decreasing returns to scale and satisﬁes:
x = F(K, L), FL, FK > 0, FLL, FKK < 0, FKL > 0, FK jK=0 = FL jL=0 = +¥













Consider now the situation a=er the economy receives a shock which alters the assets of the en-
trepreneurs. At the beginning of the second period, the distribution of capital is given by Kz with
E(Kz ¡ ¯ K) = 0. We order the entrepreneurs according to their stock of capital a=er the shock, so
3that
Kz < Kz0 if z < z0. (1)
2.1 Tirole’s condition
The demand for loans originates in those entrepreneurs z who have assets such that, given the labor
constraint, are not at the optimal capital and labor stocks, (K¤, L¤).
For these entrepreneurs, credit rationing, embodied in a moral hazard consideration we denote by
Tirole’s condition, is a possibility (see Tirole (2001)). We assume that entrepreneurs are opportunistic,
so that, if they receive a loan, they may consume it instead of using it for the project, and in that
case they also consume their a=er-shock capital stock. In this case, the probability that the project is
successful is zero.1 Let F be the ﬁxed cost of running the ﬁrm. An entrepreneur z with Kz < K¤
receives a loan Lz · K¤ ¡ Kz if and only if the following condition is satisﬁed:
f(Kz + Lz, Lz) ¡ wLz ¡ (1+ r)(Kz + Lz) ¡ F
| {z }
Standardprofits
+(1+ r)Kz ¸ (Kz + Lz)(1+ r) (2)
where the le= hand side corresponds to the utility received by the entrepreneur: proﬁts from the ﬁrm
plus any rent on capital loans; and the right hand side corresponds to the value that the entrepreneur
receives by absconding: his own capital plus the loan. In e:ect, this condition means that a loan must
have a marginal return of at least 2(1+r), a term that will become important in our analysis. We can
rewrite the inequality in the form of rents being higher than the repayment:
pz(Kz + Lz, Lz,w,1+ r;g) ¸ (1+ r)Lz (3)
Observe that this condition implies, at a minimum, that the borrowing ﬁrm must have positive
economic proﬁts (or rents) in equilibrium in order to receive a loan. In turn, this implies that an
active credit market is incompatible with a competitive equilibrium when there are constant returns to
scale. In turn, this implies that in such an environment, if labor constraints impose ine?ciencies, the
credit market may be unable to correct them.
2.2 Labor inﬂexibility
We assume that ﬁrms may face labor inﬂexibilities. We assume a very simple form of inﬂexibilities:
the ﬁrm may be unable to adjust its labor to the new conditions of the entrepreneur. The inﬂexibility
is described by the parameter 0 · g · 1, which describes the maximum allowed reduction in the
pre-shock workforce. In the case g = 1, the workforce is totally inﬂexible and ﬁrms that cannot keep
1We are assuming that entrepreneurs abscond and cannot be punished.
4all their workers must close. In the case g = 0, the workforce is totally ﬂexible. Intermediate cases
require that L ¸ g.
2.3 The case of constant returns to scale
The case in which the production function has constant returns to scale is not very interesting, because
the credit market cannot exist in the presence of Tirole’s condition, as there are no rents. However, it
is a useful benchmark to analyze the e:ect of both labor and credit constraints. Note that in this case,
any ﬁrm that has the optimal capital-labor ratio can produce e?ciently.
First, we show that Tirole’s condition, in the absence of further distortions, does not distort the
economy; the only e:ect of the shock is to redistribute income among entrepreneurs.
Proposition 1 When g = 0 (no labor inﬂexibility), the original factor prices (w0,r0) remain the equilibrium
factor prices for the economy a=er the shock. Tirole’s condition has no e:ect.
Proof Let ¯ k ´ ¯ K/L be the ﬁrst period capital-labor ratio in this economy. Assume that in the second
period all entrepreneurs keep their new stock of capital and hire or ﬁre workers so that they keep the
original capital-labor ratio ¯ k. Hence, there is no excess supply of capital or labor. By homogeneity,
wages, return on capital and output remain the same as before the shock. By homogeneity of the
production function, the factor choices of ﬁrms are optimal at the original factor prices (w0,r0).
This result shows that in the absence of inﬂexibilities, the shock has no e:ect on the economy,
except for changes in the distribution of income.2 The result fails when labor inﬂexibilities are
introduced, because ﬁrms might need to borrow, and this is only possible in an economy that generates
rents. However, observe that if loan contracts are perfectly enforceable, labor inﬂexibility is not a
problem.
Proposition 2 Under perfect enforceability of loan contracts, the original factor prices (w0,r0) remain the
equilibrium factor prices for the economy a=er the shock. Labor inﬂexibility has no e:ect.
Proof Under perfect enforceability, Tirole’s condition does not apply, and any entrepreneur can get a
loan that allows him to attain ¯ K, if she pays the market interest rate. With that capital stock, there is
no need to ﬁre any agents, so labor inﬂexibility is not a problem, and the original capita-labor ratio
is preserved, with identical ﬁrms. The loan is repaid at the market interest rate, since factor prices
are (w0,r0), and r0 is the marginal productivity of the last unit of capital used by the borrowing
entrepreneur.
2Of course, if production is non-homogenous, this result does not hold, since agents with di:erent asset levels optimize
at di:erent capital-labor ratios.
5Both opportunism and labor rigidity are required for the shock to have an e:ect in this model: if
there is su?cient labor inﬂexibility (given the extent of the shock), so that at least some ﬁrms cannot
achieve the optimal capital-labor ratio, some ﬁrms will close down, as they cannot sustain losses in
a competitive environment, and there are no rents that would allow ﬁrms to obtain loans. However,
since we have assumed perfect mobility of factors, the fact that ﬁrms disappear will have no e:ect on
the economy.
Corollary 1 If agents are opportunistic and there is su?cient labor inﬂexibility, the shock will lead to ﬁrm
closures. However, there will be no e:ect on the e?ciency of the economy.
In order to continue, it is necessary to analyze a model where there are rents. This requires the
existence of decreasing returns to scale, which we examine in the next section.
3 A model with speciﬁc capital
We assume that each ﬁrm owns speciﬁc capital T and that the production function of each ﬁrm z
is given by F(T,Kz, Lz) which has constant returns to scale. Since T is ﬁxed, this means that there
are decreasing returns to scale to the remaining factors, and the function of the remaining factors is
homothetic.3
Example 1
F(T,Kz, Lz) = Ka
zL
b
zT(1¡a¡b), a + b < 1,
a constant returns to scale production function. If T = 1, the production function can be rewritten as
f(Kz, Lz) = Ka
zL
b
z, a + b < 1.
In this case, even under competition there are economic rents that accrue to the ﬁxed factor. These
rents can be used to sustain credit, because the agent may be willing to sacriﬁce some of these rents in
order to preserve them, since closing the ﬁrm now means that the return to speciﬁc capital is lost.
The optimal conditions without restrictions are the same as before: fK = 1+r; fL = w. Because
of the homotheticity of the production function, proﬁts are maximized on a speciﬁc point (K¤, L¤)
along the ray k¤(w,r;g) ´ K¤(w,r;g)/L¤(w,r;g) in isoquant space. Before the shock, when the
stocks of all resources are the same for all ﬁrms, the equilibrium occurs at ¯ K = K¤ and L = L¤, i.e.,
each ﬁrm is already at the equilibrium.4
3The speciﬁc capital may be speciﬁc equipment, specialized knowledge –perhaps about clients preferences–, distribution
systems, etc. A function is homothetic (in a cone D) if for any x,y 2 D and t > 0, f(x) = f(y) ) f(tx) = f(ty), i.e.,
the indi:erence curves have parallel tangents along a ray from the origin.
4Otherwise, since all the ﬁrms are identical, if some other point were the optimal K¤, L¤, there would be a strictly

















































Figure 1: Constrained and unconstrained agents
Proposition 2 continues to hold in this case. If there is a labor market restriction but there is no
opportunism, all ﬁrms with Kz < ¯ K can get loans and can hire workers to get to the optimal capital
and labor stocks, while those that have more capital and labor shed those factors, because it is not
optimal to have them.
On the other hand, Tirole’s condition implies real e:ects of the shock, even if there is no labor
market restriction. The problem is that ﬁrms that cannot get loans L = ¯ K ¡ Kz, will not be able
to achieve the optimal stock of factors and, on the other hand, there will be ﬁrms with capital
stocks above the optimal level that need to loan them out, but will receive a lower return on them.
Even though all ﬁrms may be able to use the optimal capital-labor ratios (because there is no labor
constraint), this does not mean optimality, because this condition is attained only at a particular
capital and labor stock pair.
Figure 1 shows the behavior of agents in di:erent positions. First, there are agents that have more
than the optimal capital and labor (point A) which move towards the optimal point B by shedding
capital and labor. Second, the agents that are unconstrained by the labor market restriction, which
get loans to move to the optimal point (C to B). Third, those ﬁrms that are constrained by the labor
market constraint, and that ﬁrst have to try to remove the restriction by loans. The last agent that
7can achieve this is agent with stock KT. However, there may exist yet another class of agents (between
Kd and KT) which prefer to continue to operate even though they do not obtain loans, even if they
produce ine?ciently.5 Finally, there is the ﬁnal type of agents that go bankrupt, lose their speciﬁc
capital, and can invest their working capital, which is smaller that Kd. These various level of capital
are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1
Kt is the lowest level of capital that allows loans:
Kt = minKz
s.t. f(Kz + Lz, Lz) ¡ wLz ¡ (1+ r)(Kz + Lz) ¡ F ¸ (1+ r)Lz
LZ > 0
Kd is the level of capital below which a ﬁrm closes down:
0 = max
L
p(Kd + L, L)
s.t. f(Kz + Lz, Lz) ¡ wLz ¡ (1+ r)(Kz + Lz) ¡ F ¸ (1+ r)Lz
LZ > 0
which implies that f(Kd, L) ¡ (1+ r)Kd ¡ wL ¡ F = 0, because the ﬁrm receives no loans.
Kr is the lowest level of capital that allows an agent to attain the optimal (K¤, L¤).
We can immediately obtain one result:
Lemma 1 The bankruptcy capital stock and the lowest capital that allows a ﬁrm to obtain a loan is the same:
Kd = Kt.
Proof From the deﬁnition of Kt, a ﬁrm can ask for loans only if it can obtain positive rents with the
loan. A ﬁrm is in bankruptcy if it obtains negative or zero proﬁts with any possible loan, i.e., if it
cannot get loans.
The next result shows that sol long as the shock is su?ciently large that some agents are con-
strained, there are real e:ects.
Proposition 3 If there is an agent z with Kz < Kr (there are credit constrained agents), the economy is less
productive than before the shock and the interest rate is lower.
5We show below that this class of agents does not exist. Agents that do not get loans prefer to go bankrupt.
8Proof Assume ﬁrst that the optimal capital and labor stocks do not change. Demand for credit is
lower because some agents are credit constrained, so they demand less credit. Since the shock has no
e:ect on total capital stocks, at the original optimal capital stock there is an excess supply of capital
at the original interest rate. Therefore, the interest rate must fall and the optimal capital stock must
increase. The economy is worse o: for two reasons: i) there are agents who cannot achieve the optimal
capital and labor; ii) the optimal capital stock has increased with respect to the original and in an
economy with decreasing returns to scale this reduces productivity.
Finally, in the case in which some agents go bankrupt, these e:ects are enhanced, because the
bankrupt agents will o:er their working capital in the market, and they do not demand loans, leading
to a fall in the interest rate. Finally, because the speciﬁc capital of the ﬁrms that go bankrupt is lost,
there is a further negative e:ect.
In order to proceed, we develop a simpler version of this model (we show later that the current model
can be translated into the simpler model).
4 A simpliﬁed version of the previous model
Assume that the entrepreneur must have working capital on hand before he can hire workers. This
restriction could be interpreted as that fact that in a previous period, workers have labored but have
not been paid yet. Alternatively, workers require materials before they can start producing, and the
amount of materials required by each worker are constant. Using the ﬁrst interpretation, working
capital must pay the wages of workers, so there is a single factor of production, labor. Since we must
have (1+ r)(Kz + Lz) = wLz, the production function can be written as:
g(K + L;w)
where L is the loan. It is important to observe that a reduction in the equilibrium interest rate leads
to a fall in wages in this model. A positive loan depends on Tirole’s condition being satisﬁed. We can
deﬁne ˆ Lz as the maximum loan allowed by Tirole’s condition for an agent z, i.e.,6
g(Kz + ˆ Lz) ¡ F = (1+ r)(Kz + ˆ Lz) + (1+ r) ˆ Lz (4)
With these deﬁnitions we can characterize the loans received as a function of the capital stock
of the entrepreneurs. For agents with less capital than the optimal amount, loans are ﬁrst increasing
and then decreasing as the index of the agent decreases (i.e. as his stock of working capital declines).
First, because loans are increasing as z 2 [zt,z¤] falls for agents whose loans allow them to reach the
optimal capital stock. Second, that entrepreneurs in [Kt,Kr] always ask for the maximum loan they
6Note that we have used the fact that Kz + Lz = wL for the last term in the RHS.
9can get, since g0(Kz + ˆ L) > (1+ r).
Further results can be derived from an analysis of the two cases in ﬁgure 2. As can be seen
in the ﬁgure, the two cases are distinguished by whether at the point of bankruptcy (i.e., where
g(Kd)¡(1+r)Kd ¡ F = 0) the slope of the production function g0(Kd) is larger that 2(1+r). As
we have mentioned before, this slope is crucial: when the production function is steeper, additional
capital will increase production by so much that the entrepreneur will not be tempted to abscond with
the loan.
In the ﬁrst case in the ﬁgure, the slope at the point of intersection is less than 2(1 + r), so (by
the concavity of g) any positive loan for the agent with Kd will not produce enough additional rents
to ensure that the entrepreneur does not abscond. The ﬁgure also shows the rents of an entrepreneur
z with Kt = Kd < Kz < Kr as the thick line between g(Kz + ˆ Lz) ¡ F and the cost of capital and
loans, (1+r)(Kz + ˆ Lz). In this case, as Kz ! Kd = Kt, proﬁts and loans decrease smoothly towards
zero at the point of intersection.
g(K) ¡ F
2(1+ r)
Kt = Kd Kz
(1+ r)
g(K) ¡ F
Kt = Kd Kz
2(1+ r)
(1+ r)
Kz + ˆ Lz Kz + ˆ Lz
Figure 2: The two possible conﬁgurations of the bankruptcy capital stock.
In the second case in the ﬁgure, the slope g0(Kz) at the point of intersection between the line
(1 + r)Kz and the curve g(Kz) ¡ F is larger than 2(1 + r). This means that at the capital stock
of intersection, the ﬁrm can ask for strictly positive loans, and therefore the point Kd = Kt must
lie to the le= of the point of intersection. The lowest level of capital stock that allows loans is the
intersection between a line beginning at the origin with slope (1 + r) and a line with slope 2(1 + r)
tangent to g(Kz) ¡ f. An entrepreneur with that capital stock can receive a strictly positive loan, but
any decrease in the capital stock means that no loans are available. In this case, there is a discrete jump
(to zero) in the loan function to the le= of Kt. For the same reason, rents are strictly positive at Kt
and zero to the le=. Therefore
Proposition 4 1. In the case in which g(Kz) ¡ (1 + r)Kz ¡ F = 0 at a point such that g0(Kz) <
2(1+ r), Kz = Kd = Kt, loans converge to zero and there are no rents at that point.
102. In the case in which g(Kz)¡(1+r)Kz ¡ F = 0 at a point such that g0(Kz) > 2(1+r), Kz > Kt,
loans and rents are strictly positive for K0
z ¸ Kt.
Proof For part i), notice that to receive a positive loan at Kz, there must be a L > 0 such that Tirole’s
condition, equation (4), is satisﬁed. Then, note that
(1+ r)(Kz + ˆ Lz) + (1+ r) ˆ Lz = g(Kz + ˆ Lz) ¡ F < g(Kz) ¡ F + g0(Kz)L
where the ﬁrst equality comes from Tirole’s condition and the inequality is due to the concavity of
g. Using the condition g(Kz) ¡ (1 + r)Kz ¡ F = 0, we have that 2(1 + r)L · g0(Kz)L, which
contradicts the hypothesis of the proposition. Furthermore, at Kt we also have that g(Kz) ¡ (1 +
r)Kz ¡ F = 0, i.e. it is the bankruptcy point when no loans are forthcoming, so Kt = Kd. Moreover,




(1+ r) ¡ g0(Kz + ˆ Lz)
g0(Kz + ˆ Lz) ¡ 2(1+ r)
> 0
where the numerator is negative in the range [Kt,Kr] (because the ﬁrm cannot get loans to get it to
K¤) and the denominator is also negative so long as g0(Kz + ˆ Lz) ¡ 2(1 + r) < 0, so loans increase
with the capital stock in the range [Kt,Kr]. For the same reason, proﬁts tend to zero at Kt.
For part ii), note that since no loans are forthcoming at Kz < Kt, g(Kz)¡(1+r)Kz ¡ F < 0, by
the deﬁnition of Kt (see ﬁgure) and hence Kt = Kd. The same di:erentiation argument as above shows
that loans increase with the capital stock in the range [Kt,Kr], since in that range, g0(Kz) < 2(1+r).
By deﬁnition of Kt = Kd as the intersection of the line beginning at the origin with slope (1 + r)
and the tangent to g(Kz) ¡ F with slope 2(1 + r), the maximum loan at Kt is equal to the distance
between Kt and the abscissae, which is strictly positive, and rents are also strictly positive. It is also
obvious from the ﬁgure (or elementary computation), that if Kz < Kt, there are no loans.
One of the main results of this paper is the dependency between the shock and the equilibrium
prices and quantities in the system. Assume rectangular shocks, i.e., a uniform distribution of shocks
centered on the original average (and optimal) capital stock:
Deﬁnition 2 A shock will be a uniform distribution of Kz 2 [K¤ ¡ a,K¤ + a].
Proposition 5 1. If the shock is such that a · K¤ ¡ Kr, the only e:ect is to redistribute income from
entrepreneurs with negative shocks to those with positive shocks.
2. If the shock is such that K¤ ¡ Kt > a > K¤ ¡ Kr, then r falls and K¤ increases.
Proof The ﬁrst part is obvious, since all agents can achieve the ﬁrst best capital stock, there is no
e?ciency e:ect due to the shock.
11For the second part we proceed by contradiction. Consider the value of the optimal capital stock
for two values of the shock a0 > a. Let K¤
a be the optimal capital stock for the shock of value a.
Suppose that K¤
a remains constant when passing from a shock of size a to one of size a0. Then the
demand for credit must fall, more agents (in the measure sense) do not have access to the loans they
require in order to get to the e?cient point. Conversely, the supply of loans increases, since some
agents have larger positive shocks than under a. Hence the interest rate must fall to accommodate
the credit market. If K¤
a0 < K¤
a, the e:ect would be even stronger, because some of the agents that
were demanding loans before would now have surplus capital and the agents that were o:ering capital
before would have even more to o:er (and the agents that require loans will ask for smaller ones).
Therefore, in order for supply and demand for capital to reach a new equilibrium, K¤
a must increase.
Thus we have shown that an increase in the size of the shocks leads to higher levels of the optimal
capital stocks and lower interest rates, as some ﬁrms become rationed in the credit market and reduce
their demand for credit. The economy as a whole is less e?cient a=er the shock because of the credit
constraint (since the optimal capital a=er the shock is di:erent from that in the original equilibrium,
it must be less e?cient). In turn, the fall in interest rates leads to a fall in wages.
Note that we have been careful to restrict the size of the shocks so that no bankruptcies occur. Bankruptcies
complicate matters because two e:ects work in opposite directions. First, ﬁrms that close down return their capital
stock to the pool of capital and this tends to reduce the interest rate. On the other hand, the larger shock implies
that ﬁrms that might have been constrained with a smaller positive shock have enough capital to ask for larger
loans, increasing the demand for capital. Thus it is not obvious that in this case the interest rate falls. In fact, in
the simulations, we observe precisely this phenomenon in those cases in which the ﬁxed cost is high and entry has
high costs.
5 E:ects of the labor restriction
We have shown that the combination of a su?ciently large shock with the endogenous credit con-
straint is enough, by itself, to alter the equilibrium of the economy, shi=ing it to a higher capital-labor
ratio, and lowering the interest rate.
The addition of the labor restriction enhances these e:ects, since it sets a lower limit to the capital
stock that allows a ﬁrm to continue operating. An entrepreneur z with Kz < Kr, such that
(Kz + ˆ Lz)/w < g, (5)
goes bankrupt, even if Kz > Kt (where Kt is the one deﬁned in the absence of labor restrictions).
Since this means that additional ﬁxed capital is lost, the ine?ciency caused by shocks increases when
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Figure 3: The general model can be reduced to the speciﬁc form.
the arguments of proposition 5, an increase in gamma will lead to an increase in K¤ and a fall in r.
On the other hand, labor inﬂexibility has no e:ect when the shocks are small, i.e., a · K¤ ¡ Kr.
In that case, all agents can obtain loans that get them to the optimal point and therefore the labor
constraint is non-binding.
Proposition 6 1. If a · K¤ ¡ Kr, a labor restriction has no e:ect on the economy.
2. If for some z with Kt < Kz < Kr we have (Kz + ˆ Lz)/w < g, an increase in the labor restriction
raises K¤ and lower r.
5.1 Generalizing the model
Consider the speciﬁc factor model of section 3, where working capital and labor do not have ﬁxed
proportions. Assume that when factor prices are (w,r), a ﬁrm is operating at a point (K0, L0) o:
the ray with slope (K¤/L¤) which passes through the optimal point (K¤, L¤), as shown in ﬁgure 3.
Given the factor prices (w,r) in the equilibrium, the ﬁrm would be better o: operating at ( ¯ K, ¯ L),
which is feasible for the ﬁrm, since it lies on an isocost line with slope (w/r) that passes through
(K0, L0). This means that ﬁrms will always be located along the ray (K¤/L¤), and there will be a ﬁxed
relationship between the working capital and labor, as in the simpliﬁed model. In turn, this implies
that the ﬁrm will always operate as if it needs a given amount of capital if it wants to hire a certain
amount of labor and the analysis and the results of the previous section can be reproduced in this
more general model. In particular, propositions 4 and 5 continue to hold.
136 Simulating the model
We use Gams to simulate a simple version of the model. We assume a production function of the
type: g(K) = AKa, with 0 < a < 1. We use a uniform distribution of shocks, centered on the
original average value of the capital stock, dividing the population of entrepreneurs into N groups.
We ﬁrst compute an equilibrium with loans but without the credit constraint and use the values for
the variables interest in this simulation as our benchmark values.
We then check for credit constraints by looking at the di:erence between proﬁts and repayment of
the loan of entrepreneurs and for bankruptcy by checking if rents (excluding repayment of loans) are
positive. Observe that entrepreneurs with lower capital stocks are credit constrained or go bankrupt
with smaller shocks than those with higher capital a=er the shock. This means we can proceed
iteratively: beginning with the agent with least capital we proceed as follows:
1. If the agent is credit constrained we set his loan at the maximum possible level given the
credit constraint (due to decreasing returns to scale, larger loans increase net proﬁts for credit
constrained agents) and recalculate the equilibrium.
2. If, in the new equilibrium, the agent has negative proﬁts, the agent is bankrupt, he stops
producing and loans his capital stock. We then recalculate the equilibrium. 7.
A=er this step, we look at the agent with second to last capital, and repeat the procedure, until
there are no agents with more capital stock than the agent of the previous iteration that are credit
constrained, or until all agents are credit constrained. When the procedure converges, we register the
important variables in the solution: total production, interest rate, failed and credit constrained ﬁrms.
This procedure is implemented in Gams and appears in the appendix.
The results for representative runs of the model appear in the ﬁgures 4 and in the tables in the
appendix. We observe that the e:ects predicted by the theoretical model are present:
1. As the dispersion increases, and the ﬁrms that receive the largest negative shocks become, ﬁrst
constrained, and then go bankrupt, interest rates fall, with a big fall each time there is a
bankruptcy.
2. Similarly, the economy becomes less e?cient, and produces less. First, because constrained ﬁrms
produce away from the e?cient point and second, when ﬁrms fail, because the rents associated
to the ﬁxed factor are lost.8
7Note that the assumption that maximum loan under the Tirole condition maximizes proﬁts is due to the fact that these
are credit constrained agents, so they cannot reach the optimal capital stock with loans, so any increase in the size of the
loan increases proﬁts. See ﬁgure ??
8The case of a + b = 0.9 and ﬁxed cost of f = 0.12 is special because in this case all ﬁrms are constrained in the
original homogenous equilibrium, and in fact one ﬁrm needs to go bankrupt in order to release su?cient capital for interest
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Figure 4: e:ects of di:erent size shocks
153. The extent of the e:ects is not large, but it is signiﬁcant: the fall in output due to the increased
dispersion reached 3-5% of total output, and the interest rates can fall almost 13%.
4. The number of constrained ﬁrms can run from 6 to 11, and the number of bankrupt ﬁrms
in our simulations can run up to 3, and these can be noted in the ﬁgures by the large falls in
production.
7 Conclusions and extensions
The results of this paper show the importance of credit constraints and bankruptcies on the per-
formance of an economy that is subject to shocks. In our model, neither credit constraints nor
bankruptcies are costless. Credit constraints imply that some entrepreneurs do not operate e?ciently.
Bankruptcies lead to losses because the speciﬁc factor (human capital, investment in learning by do-
ing, etc) associated to the ﬁrm is lost, even though workers and working capital can move to other
occupations. As the size of the shocks increases, more ﬁrms become credit constrained and then go
bankrupt, and this leads to lower interest rates and lower wages and a loss in output.
Our theoretical propositions are that active credit markets can only exist in economies with de-
creasing returns, as they require rents in the presence of moral hazard. For this type of economies,
we examine shocks that a:ect agents di:erentially. We have shown that small shocks may be absorbed
without e:ects by the economies, but as they become larger, they reduce the e?ciency of the economy
and lower interest rates and wages. These results are conﬁrmed by the simulation results, which also
show that the e:ects are not negligible.
Two interesting extensions are the simulation of the e:ects of di:erent types of labor rigidities
on the economy (for example, rather than prohibiting the ﬁrm from reducing its employees beyond
a certain amount, employees could be ﬁred at a cost). and trying to incorporate dynamic aspects into
the model. As a theoretical result, we have shown that if the labor restrictions are not to constraining,
they will have no e:ect, but that the e:ects are important once rigidities surpass a certain level.
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17A Simulation results
Table 1: Simulations for a + b = 0.85
a + b dispersion Total Interest Consumption Bankruptcies Constrained Fixed
quantity rate ratio ﬁrms cost
0,0850 0,0000 8,4641 1,6162 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0800
0,0850 0,0050 8,4640 1,6126 0,9654 0,0000 3,0000 0,0800
0,0850 0,0100 8,4617 1,5974 0,9366 0,0000 5,0000 0,0800
0,0850 0,0150 8,4560 1,5790 0,9124 0,0000 6,0000 0,0800
0,0850 0,0200 8,4463 1,5604 0,8918 0,0000 6,0000 0,0800
0,0850 0,0250 8,4318 1,5405 0,8741 0,0000 7,0000 0,0800
0,0850 0,0300 8,4111 1,5207 0,8588 0,0000 7,0000 0,0800
0,0850 0,0350 8,3820 1,5009 0,8453 0,0000 7,0000 0,0800
0,0850 0,0400 8,2723 1,4696 0,8342 1,0000 8,0000 0,0800
0,0850 0,0450 8,2475 1,4576 0,8233 1,0000 8,0000 0,0800
0,0850 0,0000 8,4641 1,6162 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,1000
0,0850 0,0050 8,4634 1,6057 0,9645 0,0000 5,0000 0,1000
0,0850 0,0100 8,4597 1,5861 0,9353 0,0000 7,0000 0,1000
0,0850 0,0150 8,4524 1,5655 0,9108 0,0000 7,0000 0,1000
0,0850 0,0200 8,4407 1,5453 0,8900 0,0000 7,0000 0,1000
0,0850 0,0250 8,4236 1,5255 0,8722 0,0000 8,0000 0,1000
0,0850 0,0300 8,2980 1,4761 0,8583 1,0000 8,0000 0,1000
0,0850 0,0350 8,2810 1,4647 0,8445 1,0000 8,0000 0,1000
0,0850 0,0400 8,1585 1,4277 0,8338 2,0000 9,0000 0,1000
0,0850 0,0450 8,1468 1,4253 0,8224 2,0000 9,0000 0,1000
0,0850 0,0000 8,4641 1,3813 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,1200
0,0850 0,0050 8,3423 1,4008 0,9643 1,0000 11,0000 0,1200
0,0850 0,0100 8,3373 1,4194 0,9350 1,0000 11,0000 0,1200
0,0850 0,0150 8,3290 1,4373 0,9106 1,0000 11,0000 0,1200
0,0850 0,0200 8,1945 1,3174 0,8912 2,0000 11,0000 0,1200
0,0850 0,0250 8,1845 1,3486 0,8734 2,0000 11,0000 0,1200
0,0850 0,0300 8,1727 1,3801 0,8578 2,0000 11,0000 0,1200
0,0850 0,0350 8,0344 1,2969 0,8456 3,0000 11,0000 0,1200
0,0850 0,0400 8,0251 1,3394 0,8332 3,0000 11,0000 0,1200
0,0850 0,0450 8,0178 1,3665 0,8220 3,0000 10,0000 0,1200
18Table 2: Simulations for a + b = 0.90
a + b dispersion Total Interest Consumption Bankruptcies Constrained Fixed
quantity rate ratio ﬁrms cost
0,9000 0,0000 7,8973 1,5846 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0600
0,9000 0,0050 7,8967 1,5759 0,9643 0,0000 6,0000 0,0600
0,9000 0,0100 7,8940 1,5615 0,9348 0,0000 7,0000 0,0600
0,9000 0,0150 7,8886 1,5471 0,9101 0,0000 8,0000 0,0600
0,9000 0,0200 7,8804 1,5323 0,8890 0,0000 8,0000 0,0600
0,9000 0,0250 7,8688 1,5180 0,8709 0,0000 8,0000 0,0600
0,9000 0,0300 7,7887 1,4797 0,8563 1,0000 9,0000 0,0600
0,9000 0,0350 7,7774 1,4734 0,8422 1,0000 9,0000 0,0600
0,9000 0,0400 7,6993 1,4449 0,8307 2,0000 10,0000 0,0600
0,9000 0,0450 7,6918 1,4446 0,8194 2,0000 9,0000 0,0600
0,9000 0,0000 7,8973 1,5846 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0650
0,9000 0,0050 7,8965 1,5734 0,9641 0,0000 7,0000 0,0650
0,9000 0,0100 7,8935 1,5584 0,9345 0,0000 8,0000 0,0650
0,9000 0,0150 7,8878 1,5433 0,9097 0,0000 8,0000 0,0650
0,9000 0,0200 7,8792 1,5286 0,8885 0,0000 8,0000 0,0650
0,9000 0,0250 7,7967 1,4776 0,8716 1,0000 10,0000 0,0650
0,9000 0,0300 7,7870 1,4754 0,8557 1,0000 9,0000 0,0650
0,9000 0,0350 7,7054 1,4260 0,8425 2,0000 9,0000 0,0650
0,9000 0,0400 7,6977 1,4389 0,8031 2,0000 10,0000 0,0650
0,9000 0,0450 7,6898 1,4412 0,8188 2,0000 9,0000 0,0650
0,9000 0,0000 7,8973 1,5846 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,7000
0,9000 0,0050 7,8963 1,5700 0,9639 0,0000 8,0000 0,7000
0,9000 0,0100 7,8929 1,5545 0,9342 0,0000 8,0000 0,7000
0,9000 0,0150 7,8091 1,4724 0,9091 1,0000 10,0000 0,7000
0,9000 0,0200 7,8052 1,4501 0,8891 1,0000 11,0000 0,7000
0,9000 0,0250 7,7955 1,4680 0,8709 1,0000 11,0000 0,7000
0,9000 0,0300 7,7138 1,3771 0,8560 2,0000 11,0000 0,7000
0,9000 0,0350 7,7048 1,4105 0,8419 2,0000 11,0000 0,7000
0,9000 0,0400 7,696 1,4329 0,8295 2,0000 10,0000 0,7000
0,9000 0,0450 7,6136 1,3830 0,8191 3,0000 11,0000 0,7000
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Set i groups /1*11/;
Set j groups /1*11/;
* Model parameters
Scalars
a Production function parameter /0.45/
b Production function parameter /0.4/
d Distribution parameter /0.0/
gamma Gamma labor restriction /0.000001/
S scale of production /2.5/
Criteria Criteria /0.000001/
f costo fijo /0.12/
count conteo
count2 conteo
niter numero de iteraciones
;
*Ex post capital allocations are exogenous
Parameters
k(i) capital allocation per group;






mu(i) Shadow price of labor restriction on i
kf(i) Final capital in group i
k1 Auxiliar
kd(i) Loan of group i
q(i) Production of group i
rep(i) Repayment of loan of group i
pi(i) Profits of group i
c(i) Consumption of group i
t(i) Test for Tirole group i
20*aux a+b
cratio Ratio of max to min consumption
z Dummy for solver;



















* Here are the equations
*
Equations
Capitaleq1(i) FOC for capital with no Tirole.
Capitaleq2(i) Equation for capital with Tirole
Complementarityeq(i) Complementarity restriction on labor.
Loaneq1(i) Loan equation
mktcl Market clearing
production1(i) Production of group i
production2(i) produccion de los que quiebran
totalq Total production
Profits(i) Profits of group i
Consumption(i) Consumption group i
Tirole(i) Test for Tirole
RazonC Razon Consumos max a min















































SOLVE Case050704 USING NLP MAXIMIZING z;
******************************************************
* Setting options to save results




put "RESULTADOS MODELO DE QUIEBRAS" /;
put "Fecha:" system.date /;
put "Hora:" system.time //;
put " - Parametros iniciales" //;
put @5 "a+b:", @15 (a+b) /;
put @5 "Par. Distr:", @15 d /;
put @5 "Costo fijo:", f //;
niter = 0;
put " - Resultados iniciales" //;
put @5 "----------------------------------------------------"/;
put @5 "Iteracion", @15, ":", @25 niter /;
put @5 "---------------------------------------------------"//;
put @5 "Count", @15, ":", @25 count /;
put @5 "Count2", @15, ":", @25 count2/;
put @5 "Cratio", @15, ":", @25 cratio.l/;
put @5 "qt", @15, ":", @25 qt.l/;
put @5 "r", @15, ":", @25 r.l//;
put @5 "i", @15, ":";
loop(i, put ord(i));
put /;
put @5 "ki", @15, ":";
loop(i, put k(i));
put /;
put @5 "kd", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(kd.l(i)));
put /;
put @5 "kf", @15, ":";
loop(i, put kf.l(i));
put /;
put @5 "pi", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(pi.l(i)));
put /;
put @5 "q", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(q.l(i)));
put /;









put " - Resultados Finales" //;
while(count gt 0,
niter = niter+1;
SOLVE Case050704 USING NLP MAXIMIZING z;
put @5 "-------------------------------------------------"/;
put @5 "Iteracion", @15, ":", @25 niter /;
put @5 "-------------------------------------------------"//;
put @5 "------------------------"/;
put @5 " Pre Evaluacion Profits"/;
put @5 "------------------------"/;
put @5 "Count", @15, ":", @25 count /;
put @5 "Count2", @15, ":", @25 count2/;
put @5 "Cratio", @15, ":", @25 cratio.l/;
put @5 "qt", @15, ":", @25 qt.l/;
put @5 "r", @15, ":", @25 r.l//;
put @5 "i", @15, ":";
loop(i, put ord(i));
put /;
put @5 "ki", @15, ":";
loop(i, put k(i));
put /;
put @5 "kd", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(kd.l(i)));
put /;
put @5 "kf", @15, ":";
loop(i, put kf.l(i));
put /;
put @5 "pi", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(pi.l(i)));
put /;
put @5 "q", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(q.l(i)));
put /;
put @5 "t", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(t.l(i)));
put //;
********************Entrada al ciclo quiebras*******************
if (sum(i$(ord(i) eq count2-1), (pi.l(i))) lt Criteria,
count2 = count2-1;
kd.fx(i)$(ord(i) ge count) = -k(i);
pi.fx(i)$(ord(i) ge count2) = 0;
q.fx(i)$(ord(i) ge count2) = 0;
kf.fx(i)$(ord(i) ge count2) = 0;
SOLVE Case050704 USING NLP MAXIMIZING z;
24c.fx(i)$(ord(i) ge count2) = (1+r.l)*k(i)+f;
);






put @5 " Post Evaluacion Profits"/;
put @5 "------------------------"/;
put @5 "Count", @15, ":", @25 count /;
put @5 "Count2", @15, ":", @25 count2/;
put @5 "Cratio", @15, ":", @25 cratio.l/;
put @5 "qt", @15, ":", @25 qt.l/;
put @5 "r", @15, ":", @25 r.l//;
put @5 "i", @15, ":";
loop(i, put ord(i));
put /;
put @5 "ki", @15, ":";
loop(i, put k(i));
put /;
put @5 "kd", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(kd.l(i)));
put /;
put @5 "kf", @15, ":";
loop(i, put kf.l(i));
put /;
put @5 "pi", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(pi.l(i)));
put /;
put @5 "q", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(q.l(i)));
put /;
put @5 "t", @15, ":";
loop(i,put(t.l(i)));
put //;
);
25